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O pe n i n g  R e m a r k s
What exactly are the rules banks are subject to, and are they fit for purpose? These are 
the two questions addressed in this book ‘Are EU banks safe?’ and its descriptive com-
panion book ‘EU banking supervision’. The full rulebook on banks is difficult to find and 
grasp nowadays, both as to size and as to sources. Even if only looking at the European 
Union (EU), it runs to thousands of pages spread over regulations, directives, standards, 
guidelines and communications. These rules, their explanations and specifications are 
issued by legislators, supervisors and courts. The EU rulebooks are supplemented by 
thousands of pages at the national level in each member state that often overlap with or 
can be overruled by the EU level rules. Where the details can easily be overwhelming, 
the underlying structure is difficult to see, and the reasons why these were introduced 
are presented superficially at best in the recitals. The achievement of these goals is thus 
as difficult to confirm as the full rulebook is difficult to oversee. As the EU has been the 
primary rule maker in this area and will for the foreseeable future take over the standard 
setting for each bank operating in the EU, both books focus on the EU level rulebook 
and procedures and their repercussions for the banks, their supervisors and the member 
states.
The descriptive book ‘EU banking supervision’ serves the purpose of providing a full 
overview of what the author would have liked to know – or to have had easy access 
to – when starting to work in this field. That book is aimed to be useful both for such new 
entrants as well as for experts in some of the areas that would like to achieve an overview 
of the full banking supervision picture. Learning by doing – my personal experience – 
means that practitioners often know a lot about the subject they have been personally 
involved in, but little about other subjects that are equally important to achieve the goals 
of banking supervision.
This book ‘Are EU banks safe?’ has a different intent, and is focused on persons who are 
interested in changing or maintaining the way prudential banking supervision is struc-
tured and performed. It builds on the descriptive companion book, but focuses on what 
banking supervision should do, and whether it is able to deliver. Do and can banks and 
supervisors deliver what it says ‘on the box’, and is the description on the box correct in 
the first place? This analysis is based on my personal experience and expertise, gathered 
as a customer of banks, a legal/supervisory/policy advisor on banking regulation, and 
my involvement in national, EU and worldwide negotiations on new legislation.
The research for this book has been closed as per 1 July 2013.
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11  I n t roduc t io n
1.1 Questioning EU Banks and Their Regulation
Introduction
Banking supervision has returned to the centre of public and political attention. New 
laws are being introduced to address lessons learnt from the most recent financial 
 crisis; the 2007-2013 subprime crisis. What went wrong and what type of laws should be 
introduced or reinforced? Whether this is the right question or not is debatable. A prior 
question is what the current rules are, and whether a crisis could have been avoided if the 
existing requirements and supervision had been properly applied? And what does society 
actually want to achieve by banking supervision, and can such purpose be achieved by 
the current or future framework?
Over a period of four decades, the main features of the national laws and authorities 
in the EU member states have gradually become similar – harmonised – by EU laws. 
Financial services are essential to the goal of achieving a single market for services in the 
EU. This harmonisation policy has been successful in many respects. The vast majority 
of banking assets are now owned by a limited number of banks that operate in multiple 
member states. Wholesale customers roam freely in the single market. Retail customers 
could do so if they chose to. For civil law, tax law, language and for other reasons, they 
are less likely to cross borders to foreign banks, though they appear relatively happy to 
do business with subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks in their own jurisdiction. 
The success of this policy results in more drivers to harmonise the rules over the last four 
decades. This compensates for the fact that national public authorities no longer have 
full control of such cross border business, while the backup facilities for failing banks 
remain national.
The national laws and authorities – and the large number of EU rules they have to comply 
with – have come under criticism. Politicians and voters had the impression that super-
vision would prevent banking failures and financial crises. They were rudely disabused 
of this notion in the 2007-2013 subprime crisis. In search for safety, the body of EU rules 
continues to grow, both in the number of rules and in the impact of the rules. New pro-
posals are partly copied from national experience, partly invented by Brussels legislators, 
and partly derived from the global discussion in the context of the G20 or the Basel Com-
mittee of Banking Supervisors (BCBS). Discussions at the global level sketch the general 
direction on banking supervision, and have great informal authority. However, as they are 
not based on treaties, they are not binding on banks or on banking legislators/supervisors.
This is different for the EU rules. Member states have committed themselves (and their 
citizens) in the EU treaties to abide by the jointly agreed rules. In banking, the room 
to manoeuvre for member states has declined. The tendency has been to further limit 
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national deviations from the EU standard, which process has only accelerated in the 
wake of the 2007-2013 subprime crisis. The bulk of national rules will be amended by a 
new – largely directly applicable – set of European rules. The new set of rules contains 
copy paste sections of existing rules; some truly new proposals based on for instance new 
global standards, and some upgrades of existing features.
Background
Prudential banking supervision regulation in the EU has grown pragmatically. Start-
ing from humble, national frameworks with a minimum overlay of EU core rules, it is 
developing into an ever larger – but not consistently sophisticated – EU rulebook with 
diminishing national flavours1. The growth of the EU banking-rulebook was not driven 
by inner consistency reasons but by external drivers such as the bankruptcy of the first 
cross border operating banks (BCCI, Herstatt), the work in Basel by the BCBS and by 
various crises. Such growth spurts focus on issues where the gaps between supervision 
and bankruptcy frameworks were most glaringly obvious at that point in time. A con-
sensus between member states and between supervisors can then be arrived at on the 
protection of banks and of their clients to fill such obvious gaps, or to increase existing 
demands. Other drivers for the growth of the rulebook were technical innovations by 
banks and in financial markets, and changing political views on the importance of banks 
to specific parts of the economy. The banking/finance industry plays a key supporting 
role in the economy for commercial companies, fiscal lawyers, lawyers, accountants and 
tax authorities and vice versa. Banks provide finance or advice on funding options for 
small- and medium sized companies, national champions in industry, state debt, hous-
ing, and also provide services to consumers including the safekeeping of assets.
Both the European commission (commission) and the committee of European banking 
supervisors, since 2011 replaced by the European banking authority (CEBS/EBA) have 
performed an analysis of what could be improved in the current revision of pruden-
tial banking supervision for the discussions on the so-called CRD IV project2. These 
analyses focus on plugging gaps contained in the capital requirements directives (CRD3), 
reducing goldplating, implementing the agenda of the G20, and fighting a running battle 
on the fall-out of the 2007-2013 subprime crisis, as well as adding additional sets of rules 
on amongst others the resolution of banks when they fail. Though the rules on banking 
supervision are amended as a result of such analysis and political goals, the changes 
1 See Chapter 1.2; and R.J. Theissen, EU Banking Supervision, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 
2013, Chapters 1, 2 and 3.5.
2 The CRR 575/2013 and the CRD IV Directive 2013/36/EU will replace the CRD, gradually becoming 
applicable in the period of 2014-2021. See the Commission, impact assessments accompanying the com-
mission proposals for the CRD IV Regulation and Directive, SEC(2011) 949 final and SEC(2011) 952 
final, 20 July 2011; CEBS-EBA, Analysis on the Scope of Full Harmonization in the CRD, 8 October 
2010. 
3 The CRD actually consists of two directives, the Recast Banking Directive (RBD) and the Recast Capital 
Adequacy Directive (RCAD), while its successor legislation – the CRD IV Project that will start to apply 
in 2014 – consists of a regulation and a directive. 
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focus primarily on institutional improvements, political compromise on noticed gaps, 
and on headline numbers. Whether this will indeed help to fulfil the goals of bank-
ing supervision, or whether it mainly addresses short term events is not entirely clear 
(though addressing short term events in a crisis is a worthy purpose in and of itself).
The resulting EU rulebook does not fit well with what is known of the initial goals of this 
eclectic collection of modern and older rules regarding banks and their supervision as 
described in ‘EU banking supervision’. Core parts of EU banking supervision legislation 
were written when EU banks were relatively small, relatively national, and operating in 
non-liberalised capital markets. The goals and the content of the rules were not very well 
defined to begin with. The CRD licensing requirement focuses on pure deposit taking 
and lending business, while larger and smaller banks have broken out of such confines 
(if  those ever existed). Traditional banks are not the main focus of the new capital 
calculation rules that have been introduced since, e.g. on securitisation or derivatives. 
These instead focus on the large, cross-border and very diversified financial businesses of 
banks and the groups to which they belong. In this book, the term ‘bank’ generally refers 
to licensed banks (in EU terminology ‘credit institutions’) currently operating in the EU, 
though whether the underlying definition and the target of the licensing obligation are 
correct is the subject of chapter 4.3 and 4.4.
Capital buffers intend to reduce the chances of failure of a bank; and to increase a high 
pay-out if a bank does fail. Phrased in this manner, the goal of the calculation of capital 
requirements commits banks and the prudential authorities involved to aspire towards 
achieving stability and protection, and not to guarantee the achievement of stability and 
protection. This is also emphasized by prudential supervisors4. However, in case of an 
actual bankruptcy or in times of a crisis, the expectations of the general population of 
politicians, and even of banks, appears to indicate a commitment of some sort as to the 
result, perhaps even a no-fail regime. This may be a result of changing societal expecta-
tions since the 1970’s when capital buffers were first introduced, or because nobody ever 
believed or wanted to believe the formal limitations on the achievability of the goals set.
Alternatively, the discrepancy between aspirational goals and crisis-expectations can 
be the result of changing market circumstances, with banks anno 2013 playing differ-
ent and more systemic roles than tradition dictates. There appears to be no commonly 
agreed theoretical background for banking supervision, neither is there any agreement 
4 Recital 34 CRD IV Directive. T. Padoa-Schioppa, Regulating Finance, OUP, Oxford, 2004, Chapter 1. 
Also see various authors in A. Joanne Kellermann, J. de Haan, F. de Vries, (Eds.), Financial Supervision 
in the 21st Century, Springer, Amsterdam, 2013. R.J. Theissen, European Banking Supervision, Eleven 
International Publishing, The Hague, 2013, Chapter 4.3.
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on the goals thereof and the level of certainty that the goals will be achieved between the 
public, politicians, academia, banks and supervisors5.
1.2 An Introduction to EU Banking Supervision
Introduction
The discussion on the desirability and impact of the new rules is hampered by the fact 
that a full overview of existing banking rules is difficult to obtain. Most proposals focus 
on specific features, without necessarily setting out what was already there, what the 
actual upgrade is (if any), and how it fits into the wider picture of banking supervision 
related legislation. As the EU rules increasingly dictate the exact conditions under which 
banks and banking supervisors operate in the member states, a full description is also 
useful in and of itself.
The core of the current EU legislation on the supervision of banks is formed by the Capi-
tal Requirements Directive or CRD. Even though the term CRD suggests a single piece 
of work, it actually consists of two directives:
– directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 June 2006 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast); 
and
– directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 
on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast).
These are referred to as the ‘Recast Banking Directive’ (RBD) and the ‘Recast Capital 
Adequacy Directive’ (RCAD) respectively in this book. In the RBD, the main elements of 
licensing, ongoing prudential supervision and termination of banks are dealt with. The 
RCAD deals with a specific subject only: the treatment of market risk. This has been kept 
outside the RBD, because it is also relevant to specialised non-bank firms which operate 
in the financial markets. The RCAD contains the common framework for banks and 
non-bank investment firms for the treatment of market risk (and the prudential treat-
ment in general of non-bank investment firms). The RBD and RCAD will be replaced by 
a new regulation and directive in the context of the CRD IV project. It will recast the 
existing version of the CRD into the capital requirements regulation 575/2013 (‘CRR‘) 
and the capital requirements directive IV 2013/36/EU (‘CRD IV directive‘). These will 
replace the RBD and RCAD from the start of 2014, though large parts of the CRR will 
enter into force only at the end of 2014, and the main innovations (on capital quality and 
the amount of such capital needed) will only enter into force from 2016-20216. The divi-
sion of subjects is different here, with common and directly applicable rules contained in 
5 Along these lines also C. A.E. Goodhart, ‘Financial Regulation, Credit Risk and Financial Stability’, 
National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 192 (1), 2005, pp. 118-127, who also notes the lack of economic 
theory behind capital requirements.
6 Art. 163 CRD IV Directive and Art. 521.2 CRR. Aspects of a liquidity ratio will apply from 2015; see 
below.
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the regulation, while subjects where more flexibility was deemed necessary was allocated 
to the directive. The CRD IV directive needs to be implemented in the laws of each mem-
ber states before it becomes applicable to banks.
The focus of this book and of the companion book ‘EU banking supervision’ is both 
on the currently applicable regulations and the legislative agenda being rolled out after 
the most recent financial crisis hit. Most of the current rules were drafted before the 
crisis, though they are in the process of being amended at the date of this publication 
(for instance by the CRD IV project). Additional rules are being discussed (such as the 
projected use of European rescue funds to recapitalize national banks, or the proposals 
on crisis management tools that have so far been left to national discretions). The detailed 
description contained in ‘EU banking supervision’ serves a dual purpose. It aims to 
provide a common basis of knowledge for people working or studying in the field of 
banking supervision in the EU, or unfamiliar with parts of the broad array of banking 
supervision requirements and instruments. A practical problem for that detailed discus-
sion – and for the subsequent analysis in this book – is that banking supervision is not a 
particularly academic piece of work, nor can it be looked at in isolation from a range of 
other academic and practical issues. Banking and its supervision are strongly influenced 
by tax law, accountancy, company law, public law, economic models, monetary policy, 
pragmatism, politics and lots and lots of money. The result makes both the law and the 
practice complex, and subject to continuous change. An additional problem is that there 
is little consensus on exactly how banking supervision works, or how the law should be 
applied. Both ‘EU banking supervision’ and this book are thus built upon my interpreta-
tion of the requirements, and my reading of the facts. These interpretations are where 
possible based on jurisprudence, literature, and EU based supervisory publications. This 
chapter introduces the key points of this analysis of the existing situation of prudential 
supervision as derived from the descriptive book.
Licensing, living, liquidating – the lifecycle of a bank
The focus of this book is on banks. This is a relatively narrowly defined concept, though 
they perform a wide range of financial services. The definition used in the CRD is 
given for a so-called ‘credit institution’. It is ‘an undertaking the business of which is to 
receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own 
account’. The credit institution term is used by EU legislators when they want to refer to 
banks7. This automatically implies that credit is the core business of banks, even though 
banks offer a much wider range of services, and credit may only be a supporting func-
tion to bank’s investment, payment or other services. This legislative custom is not used 
in this book, instead the more common terminology of banks is used. When using it in 
the context of the legislation, and for instance answering the question whether the defi-
nition used is fit for purpose (see chapter 4.3), the term bank is used as synonymous to 
the CRD-terminology of credit institution.
7 Art. 4.1 RBD and Art. 4.1 sub 1 CRR.
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Like persons, undertakings and legal entities are born (established), live (function) and 
die (are liquidated with their assets distributed to others). Almost all banks are legal enti-
ties, though unlike for some other types of prudentially supervised financial enterprises, 
this is not a condition imposed by EU law8. The definition of a bank instead focuses on 
any undertaking that performs the so-called transformation function by using deposits 
and other repayable funds obtained from members of the public (and often due to be 
repaid immediately at the discretion of the client), and ‘transform’ those funds into long 
term loans for the own account of the bank to for instance consumers or to businesses 
and governments. As part of establishing itself as a bank, a new or existing undertaking 
will need to obtain a license in its member state. A new bank has to fulfil a range of 
conditions to obtain such an authorisation to operate as a bank, including having suf-
ficient initial capital, suitable management and owners, and presenting a business plan 
under which it shows it will be able to function while fulfilling on a continuous basis 
both these initial licensing requirements and any requirements that will apply once it 
becomes a bank9.
The EU treaty freedom of establishment allows persons, including legal entities, to estab-
lish themselves anywhere in the EU, subject to certain safeguards in the public inter-
est. Banking is one of the industries that have a high impact on the local economy and 
financial system. If non-harmonised, under the general good/public policy exceptions, a 
member state could thus impose their own requirements on banks from other member 
states that want to perform these activities in their territory, making the freedom of a 
theoretical nature only for banking services. The EU can attempt to harmonize the areas 
where member states could and would otherwise act unilaterally in a way that limits 
cross border activities. For banking, this has taken the form of introducing minimum 
standards of prudential banking requirements and the supervision thereof10. This reduces 
the scope for unilateral action under the general good/public policy rule, as the member 
states – when sufficient member states agree to the harmonised rules under the qualified 
majority voting system in place – indicate that this is the level of protection needed. As a 
result, once an entity has obtained a banking license from a EU supervisor and is super-
vised under the agreed minimum level or requirements, other member states can only 
claim the need to perform additional tests or set additional demands for the remaining 
unharmonised areas (such as the amount of cash a bank needs to have available to fulfil 
8 An undertaking of a natural person or a partnership that does not qualify as a legal entity under local 
laws is not prohibited from obtaining a license. A new bank will generally be incorporated into a legal 
entity to separate its assets from the (debts and other) assets of its owner, and to be able to raise capi-
tal. Arts. 4.1, 4.2, and 6 RBD respectively Art. 8 CRD IV Directive and 4.1 sub 1 and 42 CRR. Com-
pare Art. 17 and Annex III Solvency II Directive 2009/138/EC that allows only specific legal forms for 
insurers, or Art. 4.1 sub 1 Mifid 2004/39/EC that defines an investment firm to be a legal person (with 
a national discretion to allow exemptions), and Art. 2 sub 1 Electronic Money Directive 2009/110/EC.
9 Arts. 6-17 RBD and Arts. 8-18 CRD IV Directive.
10 Case C-233/94, Deposit Guarantee Case, Germany/Parliament and Council, Court of Justice 13 May 
1997, § 10-21. Case 2/74, Reyners/Belgium, Court of Justice 21 June 1974. Also see R.J. Theissen, EU 
Banking Supervision, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2013, Chapters 3.5 and 5.
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obligations towards depositors and other creditors). Any subsequent activities a bank 
wants to develop in other member states, benefit from a lighter touch assessment either 
under a notification procedure referred to as the European passport (for branches and 
cross border services that are considered activities that take place within the legal entity 
that has obtained the banking license), or under the EU treaty freedom of establishment. 
For subsidiary legal entities, the bank has to obtain a separate license, but under the EU 
treaty freedom of establishment the right of refusal of the supervisor of the subsidiary is 
limited. This applies also for the assessment whether the parent bank is a proper (full or 
partial) owner of a subsidiary bank11.
With a license, obligations and rights are bestowed upon a bank. It becomes subject to 
prudential requirements that aim to increase its solidity, so that it becomes a dependable 
part of the financial system, as well as subject to supervisors with a range of instru-
ments to verify and enforce such requirements (see below). Its license allows it to attract 
funds without a prospectus from retail clients as well as from wholesale clients. It also 
allows it to operate a wide range of services which are the subject of a series of conduct of 
business and consumer protection directives and regulations that regulate issues such as 
consumer credit, payment services, e-money instruments, or investment services, with-
out becoming subject to separate licensing procedures and mostly avoiding additional 
prudential rules (except for specific internal governance demands)12. The conduct of 
business requirements for performing such regulated services do apply also if the service 
provider is a bank instead of a specialised provider. The conduct of business require-
ments are not the subject of this book, which focuses on the prudential side of banking 
super vision. They nonetheless provide important safeguards for public policy/general 
good, by requiring banks to treat all or certain customers fairly, which is sometimes 
specified in great detail, to act with integrity in the markets, and to disclose relevant 
information to clients or to markets.
As long as the bank complies with all specific prudential demands, it is likely (but not 
guaranteed) to retain its license and to continue to operate under its own management, 
11 Recitals 7 and 10 and Arts. 16, 22-40 RBD, and Recitals 15 and 16 and Arts. 17, 33, 35-52 CRD IV Direc-
tive establishes the European passport for branches and subsidiaries. Both branches and subsidiaries 
are covered by Art. 53 TFEU, that allows any local company to perform activities elsewhere either in 
the form of a branch or a subsidiary, at its discretion. The public policy exceptions allow a host member 
state to do a limited assessment under the agreed notification procedure for branches and the licensing 
procedure for subsidiaries, but only to the extent necessary to safeguard such public policy goals. See for 
the limited possibilities to add requirements for instance, Case C-442/02, Caixabank France, Court of 
Justice 5 October 2004, and Case C-452/04, Fidium Finanz, Court of Justice 3 October 2006.
12 Art. 23 and Annex I RBD, and Art. 33 and Annex I CRD IV Directive on Deposit Taking and on the 
Range of Services Covered for Prudential Purposes by the European Passport. Also see Art. 1.2 Mifid 
Directive 2004/39/EC, Arts. 1.1 sub a, 3, 10 and 11 Electronic Money Directive 2009/110/EC, for exam-
ples of the exemptions from the licensing process given to banks supervised under the CRD (and for the 
absence of exemptions on internal governance aspects and conduct of business and consumer protec-
tion requirements).
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setting out is own course within the boundaries set by company law, prudential and 
conduct of business requirements. Both to the benefit of the bank and to its detriment, 
the prudential requirements have a certain flexibility built into their phrasing. This can 
be the result of (i) the use of ‘adequate’ or other non-specific qualifiers in demands, or 
(ii) due to their use of undefined or incomprehensively defined terms (effectively direct, 
own funds, public), as well as (iii) due to the subjectivity and margin of appreciation 
built into the triggers for action of central banks, governments, deposit guarantee funds 
and supervisors to intervene not only when it is clear that a bank is a danger to society, 
but also when it appears likely that it will become a danger to society due to future risks 
or developments13. This flexibility allows that a supervisor gives a bank the benefit of 
the doubt even if it is not strictly (or only in a very lenient interpretation) compliant 
with the requirements, or is very likely to return to compliance in an acceptable time-
frame (regulatory forbearance). On the other hand, a supervisor can decide to act to 
replace management or to require additional buffers when there are ‘only’ doubts about 
future non-compliance instead of also certainty about current non-compliance. When 
either the bank or the public authorities that are involved thinks the bank is no longer 
viable, or is no longer viable in a profitable manner, the bank can be voluntarily or – if 
requirements following from administrative law and human rights protections are 
met – involuntarily liquidated. If the bank is relatively small and has many competitors 
that are alternative service providers, such a demise is relatively painless, except if any 
unexpected losses surface which would eat into the financial buffers of the bank to the 
extent that its commitments cannot be fully met on time (or at least after the liquidation 
of all its assets). If the bank is large, has large unexpected losses, or is the only provider of 
a specific useful service, this may disrupt the market as well as the trust clients of other 
banks put in their banks. The triggers for intervention by public authorities are made 
flexible to allow them to try to avoid such disruptions. Determining when to fail a bank 
is difficult in the light of the flexibility given, the potential but unknown impact of the 
failure on counterparties and the financial system as a whole, and meeting any burden of 
proof to show that invasive action is needed if that is not in consensus with the bank or 
its owners. The outer limit set for intervention is not part of the CRD, but of the deposit 
guarantee directive. This directive serves a dual purpose: it protects consumers and 
small- and medium sized companies from the negative effect of losing cash entrusted to 
a bank (for instance savings or current accounts) up to an amount of 100.000 euro per 
person per bank, but on the other hand indicates that public authorities cannot allow a 
bank to continue operating in an undisturbed manner if either a judge has pronounced 
it bankrupt or in a moratorium of debts procedure, of if a deposit that is due and claimed 
has not been repaid to the client for a certain number of days14.
13 Arts. 54, 124 and 136 RBD and Arts. 97, 102 and 104 CRD IV Directive. Also see below on the use of the 
instruments of supervisors.
14 Arts. 1, 2, 3.5, 7, 10 and Annex I Deposit Guarantee Directive 1994/19/EC.
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Quality, quantity and common sense
To limit the chance that the bank or the supervisor need to decide that the bank is broke 
or unlikely to meet obligations at a future date, the EU rules set out several categories of 
requirements on banks. The main categories are:
– quantitative requirements;
– qualitative requirements;
– public disclosure requirements;
– reporting and other information provision requirements to the supervisor.
Quantitative requirements focus on the solvency ratio and on the initial capital require-
ment. The latter is a rough and ready minimum level of financial buffers (in that case, 
mainly composed of equity and published reserves) of at least 5 million euros that has to 
be available both when applying for a license and on a continuous basis after absorbing 
any losses15. The solvency ratio is the reason why the CRD has its current name. This 
capital requirements calculation on which the vast majority of the current CRD provi-
sions focus, establishes how large the financial buffers need to be to cover unexpected 
losses due to credit risk, market risk and operational risk16. For these three main risk 
categories, capital requirements are calculated using either a standardised model set out 
in the CRD, or alternatively using an internal model of the bank that fulfils minimum 
requirements set out in the CRD and is approved by the supervisors. For credit risk and 
market risk, the calculation is made per exposure (an asset such as a mortgage loan to a 
client or an off balance sheet potential claim) that looks at the relative risk that the claim 
will not be repaid respectively which will decline in value due to for example fluctuating 
foreign exchange rates or market values. For operational risk, an assessment is made that 
to for instance fraud by employees or clients, a fire or a terrorist attack which will lead to 
costly disruptions or other losses.
The amount of financial buffers needed due to the solvency ratio is 8 %. In essence, the risk 
weighted capital requirements for the risk categories are added up, and need to be met by 
certain types of buffers to the tune of in total 8% of this amount. Theoretically, if the unex-
pected risks that are calculated all materialize over the next year, the bank would be able 
to absorb all of such losses with its buffers (and may be bankrupt as a result, but at least all 
claims of normal creditors would still be repaid upon liquidation). At the moment, only 
a quarter of this 8% demand needs to consist of high quality equity and public reserves, 
the rest of the demanded financial buffers can be covered by hybrid bonds, long term and 
even short term subordinated loans, in an area riddled by national discretions that allow 
local legislators to allow their banks to insert even lower quality capital components17. 
Both the amount of financial buffers and the quality demands are increased in the wake 
of the 2007-2013 financial crisis (mostly from 2016), while certain improvements in the 
15 Arts. 9 and 75 RBD and Art. 18 RCAD, respectively Art. 12 CRD IV Directive and Arts. 92-93 CRR.
16 For large exposures a small add-on capital requirement is calculated if certain maximum thresholds are 
exceeded.
17 Arts. 57, 66 and 75 RBD and Art. 18 RCAD.
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calculation of capital requirements (mostly for market risk and for the treatment of secu-
ritised assets) have been in place since 2010. The financial buffers improvement means 
that a larger component of the 8% will need to be covered by equity and public reserves, 
thus certain capital components such as short term subordinated loans will no longer 
be acceptable, and that additional buffers will need to be maintained on top of the 8%, 
depending on the business of the bank and its systemic relevance to around 13% of the 
risk weighted capital requirements18. In due course, additional quantitative demands will 
need to be met to address liquidity risks (can the bank fulfil – even in a crisis situation – in 
the short and in the long term its obligations to give cash back to its investors and credi-
tors as promised), and a so-called leverage ratio (in an unweighted manner, how much 
financial buffers does the bank have that can absorb unexpected losses)19.
Any expected losses are left out of scope of the capital requirements, and are required 
to be deducted from the financial buffers before checking whether there are sufficient 
buffers to meet the minimum 8% requirement. These quantitative demands are often 
referred to as the first pillar of banking supervision.
The qualitative requirements focus on the internal organisation of the bank, and 
especially on the checks and balances and the trustworthiness of its books. The major 
managers who effectively direct the business of the bank need to be both competent 
and trustworthy (be suitable/fit and proper) for their tasks, manage an organisation that 
keeps records and should be able to make decisions in a risk-appropriate way, verified 
by internal back office procedures (risk control functions). Supervisory authorities often 
do not have extensive resources, therefore a large part of verifying the health of the 
institution builds on the strength of the internal management layers, the correctness of 
the internal reports on risks and trends, and the self-cleansing capacities of the bank’s 
procedures. These demands are both part of the initial assessment whether a bank can 
obtain a license, and need to be met on an ongoing basis. If a bank makes use of more 
sophisticated internal models to calculate pillar 1 capital requirements, it will need to 
meet additional specific demands to ensure that its models lead to trustworthy results, 
or are upgraded when they show deficiencies. As part of additional ongoing require-
ments, a banks needs to self-assess whether its organisation (and its buffers) are sufficient 
to withstand any risks it faces or may face (and to take measures if it does not think 
so, including upgrades in its organisation or holding additional financial buffers). This 
self-assessment – with the supervisory review of that self-assessment that is a key part 
of supervisory tasks – is often referred to as the second pillar of banking supervision20.
Banks are subject to a range of reporting obligations to the public and to supervisors. 
The  public transparency obligations flow from normal company law/annual accounts 
rules, but the CRD adds to these by instituting additional public disclosure require-
ments on information that relates to the banks risks, and how it meets such risks from a 
18 Arts. 25-88, 92, 465-491, 494, 501, 504 CRR and Arts. 129-134, 160, 162 CRD IV Directive.
19 Arts. 86-87 CRD IV Directive and Arts. 8, 21, 412-413, 429, 451, 460-461, 499, 509-511 and 521 CRR.
20 Arts. 123 and 124 RBD, and Arts. 73 and 97-98 CRD IV Directive.
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 prudential supervision perspective (often referred to as the market discipline component 
or third pillar of banking supervision) and an even wider set of periodic and ad hoc 
reporting requirements to the supervisory authorities21.
Standing alone or together
The supervision of the bank is different if it is a fully stand-alone entity, or if it is part 
of a group. This is the result of a discrepancy between economic/commercial and legal 
approaches, which are both accommodated in the CRD. The requirements on capital 
adequacy and organisation are primarily developed by economists/accountants and 
managers, who look at a functioning banking group as in essence one economic entity, 
perhaps divided in different business lines to make a bank more manageable and to bet-
ter allocate resources. This mind-set is dominant in for instance the worldwide set of 
standards on capital in the form of the Basel capital accord (in any of its versions from 
the 1988 Basel I version to the Basel III version that will be implemented via the CRD IV 
project in the EU from 2014). From the legal point of view, such a group-wide economic 
entity does not exist, or rather it exists but as a group – with ownership and contractual 
ties – of legal entities. The group does not have a license, only an individual legal entity 
has a license, and it alone is allowed to operate – and subjected to prudential require-
ments – as a bank. These requirements also can be enforced only against the legal entity 
to which they are addressed. Importantly, it is the legal entity that goes bankrupt. Once 
a liquidation scenario approaches, the pay-out to individual creditors will be determined 
by the health of that individual entity in the form of the assets of that entity compared to 
its liabilities, not by the group wide assets and liabilities.
This leads to a two-step approach to accommodate the economic reality of the group 
during the lifetime of the bank with requirements both on a solo basis to prepare for 
a liquidation, and on a consolidated basis to address the group-wide economic entity; 
simultaneously preventing the multiple legal entities from being used to hide existing 
risks from the eyes of creditors and supervisors. The licensing and liquidation phase 
meanwhile remain firmly solo based, at best looking sideways at claims and service 
agreements between group entities as a source of relief or of risk.
Many of the ongoing quantitative and qualitative requirements will be applied to each 
individual bank legal entity on a solo basis, and will also need to be met on a consolidated 
basis by the relevant bits of the group of which the bank is part. This consolidated view 
of the group includes any parent, its parents, siblings and subsidiaries within the group. 
The consolidation concept is derived from the accountancy concept, with adaptations to 
include the relevant parents, and exclude entities that are not deemed relevant, or that are 
used to manage risks in another manner. Examples of excluded entities are vehicles used 
21 For public disclosure see Art. 145 and Annex XII RBD and Arts. 13, 431-455 CRR, and for report-
ing obligations see for instance Art. 74.2 RBD and Art. 99-101CRR, and a range of specific obligations 
spread over the CRD and the CRD IV/CRR (for instance Arts. 26, 40 CRD IV Directive and Art. 430 
CRR).
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to manage securitised assets, or non-financial parents or industrial production subgroups 
owned by the same parent (such as a holding that owns a car financing bank subsidiary 
and a car production subsidiary). Other demands only apply at the consolidated level, 
or the licensing supervisor can give exemptions of solo application of requirements22. 
For instance, disclosure of additional CRD information under the so-called third pillar 
is mandatory for the group (applied to the highest entity), while subsidiaries are mostly 
exempted. Whether or not pillar 2 requirements are made on subsidiary banks depends 
on the local supervisor. The subsidiaries and parents are captured in the consolidated 
check of compliance, depending on the exact structure of the group, and on the business 
of the individual entities involved.
Where the bank can be subject to solo and consolidated requirements, the public authori-
ties can have or take a parallel responsibility. The primary responsibility is for the entities 
it licenses, but sometimes it is given additional tasks – and in fewer cases instruments – 
in relation to both that entity and its subsidiaries and other related companies captured 
in the consolidation. The supervisor that licensed the (generally highest) bank in the 
group is called the consolidating supervisor. In ongoing supervision, this supervisor 
has the responsibility to coordinate the flow of information between the relevant super-
visors, prepare joint decisions of all these supervisors on issues specifically identified in 
the CRD to be of joint interest, and try to influence them to act in a coordinated manner. 
The interested supervisors will include all supervisors that licensed a bank which is part 
of the group, or where a branch is located that is locally systemically relevant (plus other 
public authorities such as EBA and central banks). This type of joint work per banking 
group is performed in the context of so-called colleges of supervisors. The colleges do not 
have decision making power, but are a forum for consultation and coordination. Their 
effectiveness is monitored and supported by EBA, the European banking authority of 
which all national supervisors are part (its highest decision making board is composed of 
representatives of member state supervisors). Powers are vested primarily on the national 
supervisors, except that the coordinating supervisor can overrule other supervisors on 
the approval of internal models by banks to calculate the capital requirements for credit 
risk, market risk and operational risk; and has a strong say at the consolidated level for 
supervisory reviews of the risks a bank faces (but on a solo basis, the other supervisors can 
deviate from the position taken by the college). EBA is empowered to mediate in conflicts 
within colleges, and sometimes to take a binding decision if the EU rules specifically 
allocate that power to it, and as long as it does not touch upon the fiscal responsibilities of 
a member state. That latter exemption will almost always be the case in a crisis situation. 
Neither EBA nor other supervisors in a college can prevent a supervisor on an individual 
entity to take emergency measures, though they are requested to take into account the 
financial stability consequences in other member states of unilateral actions23. Within 
the Eurozone, the intent is to create a banking union with a joint supervisor and joint 
22 Recital 13 and 15 and Arts. 1.2, 68-70, 118- RBD, respectively Arts. 108-110, 129-131 CRD IV Directive 
and Arts. 6-23 CRR.
23 Arts. 40.3, 42a.3, 131a.2 and Annex XI § 1a RBD and for instance recital 50 CRD IV Directive.
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financing of crisis measures, alongside the joint monetary authority/lender of last resort. 
Though political agreement has been achieved, the financing, cooperation measures and 
transitional regimes were not published when this book closed, and will require success-
ful negotiations on all aspects and details, and building up funds and practices to make 
it work successfully in practice from – currently predicted – the end of 2014 or the start 
of 201524.
EBA succeeded the so-called committee of European banking supervisors or CEBS in 
201025. It is the most recent and most powerful of a range of bodies set up to foster co-
operation between European supervisors, starting in 1972 with the groupe de contact. 
In addition to the informal discussion, cooperation and policy development roles played 
by its predecessors, EBA has gained an explicit role in developing binding legislation (by 
drafting standards that are expected to be adopted unchanged by the commission, that 
will subsequently apply directly both to supervisors and banks), its role in colleges and 
its mediation and conflict resolution tasks. In addition, it can perform EU wide stress test 
exercises, and intervene in certain crisis circumstances.
Instruments vs. trust
To some extent, the goals of the prudential supervisor and of the bank run in parallel. 
Both are eager to get depositors to deposit their money at the bank, and eager for the 
bank to perform its funding role to the commercial sector and to the state, as well as to 
provide other services they perform in the economy26. Banks are expected (and forced) 
to police themselves, and to have effective and efficient reporting in place on financial 
information and risk factors so that they can manage themselves effectively. The inter-
nal part of it is (enforced) self-regulation in which the prudential supervisor trusts27. The 
internal reporting and back office checks serve to make the bank in all its components, 
including its board, aware of the risks and rewards of each activity, and whether they 
match. Banks are also mandated – and trusted – to send accurate information on an 
ongoing basis to the supervisor, and contact the supervisor if incidents occur. The trust 
the supervisor places in the bank is often well deserved, and supported by the knowledge 
that the supervisor does sometimes perform a verification of the information provided, 
and has a range of reparative and corrective instruments at its disposal to evict anyone 
caught deliberately or incompetently providing false information. Without trusting on 
the procedures in the bank, the prudential supervisor would need the type of humongous 
resources that are not available on the public purse, not even if the banks would pay for 
it. Supervisors basically supervise the internal supervisors (risk officers and the executive 
24 The single supervisory mechanism will start functioning at some point late in 2014, a year after the final 
texts have been published (if the operational preparations are finalized), and a joint resolution authority 
is proposed to be in place by the start of 2015. See Chapter 4.6.
25 EBA Regulation 2010/1093.
26 See Chapter 2.
27 M. Power, Organized Uncertainty, Designing a World of Risk Management, OUP, Oxford, 2007, Chap-
ter 2.
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and non-executive board members) who in turn supervise and/or manage the business 
risks. Part of the investigative instruments focuses on checking whether the trust placed 
in these internal officers is well deserved. This means that supervisors need to question 
directly, but also verify independently in a risk aware manner (e.g. by blind testing and 
validation). If transgressions occur, the response should be commensurate both with the 
transgression itself as well as with the impact on the trust-based relationship with the 
external supervisor; taking into account the response of the internal supervisory regime. 
The latter can be a mitigating, neutral or extenuating factor or even an independent 
transgression if it involves a cover-up. A gradated response is necessary both to foster a 
mutual trust environment (this will make the reporting of incidents more speedy), and 
also to make clear that transgressions are in and of itself a violation of trust28. It can be 
argued that in prudential supervision the final outcome is more important than compli-
ance with each individual requirement. However, if trust is not expected and demanded, 
and violations of individual requirements punished, that final outcome is certain to be 
ruinous. The investigative instruments of supervisors (reporting, on site visits, ad hoc 
information demands addressed to the bank, its accountants and group-companies as 
well as from other supervisors) are built on trust, and how to verify whether such trust 
was correctly given29. Such verification provides the core of ongoing supervision. The 
corrective instruments set out the palette that is available to gradate responses to viola-
tions in trust, and in primary transgressions. These instruments range from a (formal) 
disciplinary talk or written warning if the transgression is both small and not repeated 
within the banks’ organisation to – as ultimate sanctions – a withdrawal of the license 
of the bank or a withdrawal of the supervisory approval of a board member as a fit and 
proper person. The ultimate intervention is, however, not seen as a punishment or as 
corrective, and it goes beyond the trust of the supervisor towards the trust of the society 
in the bank. It involves pushing a bank into liquidation at a moment in time when its 
continued existence without public action would impact on the society in a too negative 
manner; for instance when it does not honour its commitments towards depositors any 
more, or is likely to cause instability of the financial system.
Effective, proportionate, and dissuasive
Even if the supervisor or another authority has a right to act, he can decline to act (unless 
the law explicitly binds him to act in certain circumstances). Even when he can and 
wants to act, he is bound to respect the human rights protection and the administra-
tive law protection of the bank, of its employees, and any other legal or natural person 
who is the addressee or victim of an intervention30. The rights of a fair trial, to privacy, 
28 See Chapters 2 and 3; J. Viñals & J. Fiechter, The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to Say ‘No’, 2010, 
IMF SPN/10/08.
29 Arts. 43 and 137-142 RBD, Art. 36.3 RCAD (respectively Arts. 4, 118, 122-126, 159 CRD IV Directive 
CRR) and Art. 15 Financial Conglomerates Directive. 
30 See for instance Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst AG v Commission, Judgment of the Court 
21 September 1989, § 12 and 13 and Case 374/87, Orkem S.A. v Commission, Judgment of the Court 
18 October 1989, § 28-33. Also see D. Chalmers, C. Hadjiemmanuil, G. Monti, T. Giorgio, A. Tomkins, 
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to  property, to have a business, and for instance the presumption of innocence in crimi-
nal matters need to be respected in the design of rules and in their application, though 
the right of privacy only protects natural persons such as bank managers, and not legal 
entities.
Most of such human rights or administrative law protections against measures taken 
by the supervisor can be limited by the CRD or other prudential rules if the limita-
tion is in line with an exception to the fundamental or administrative right involved. 
Whether invoking such limits is effective will depend on the circumstances of the case. 
For instance, actions that impact on the property rights of a bank or of its shareholders 
can be taken, but only if a clearly identified interest is at stake that is important enough 
(such as a crisis at the bank with potential negative effects on its clients and on society as 
a whole), that cannot be solved in another manner and for which provisions have been 
made in a law to make them proportional. Such outer limits to regulatory actions help 
to prevent arbitrary actions of a government, or prevent a government from allocating 
all losses to one party to the unbalanced benefit of the bank or of the government. For 
instance, expropriation of property rights embedded in bonds or shares without com-
pensation of the market value of such property rights is likely to be illegal, even if there 
is a crisis. Both the law and the way it was applied needs to be compliant, though public 
authorities are given leeway to determine whether e.g. there is a crisis, and whether an 
intervention is appropriate and sufficient compensation is paid31.
The leeway to not act, to practice legal or informal forbearance32, is equally not without 
limits. Under the EU treaties, the member states have to take any appropriate meas-
ure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the 
treaties or resulting from e.g. directives or regulations. The court of justice33 has held 
that under this obligation, the member states have leeway to choose, for instance, the 
European Union Law, CUP, Cambridge, 2006, Chapter 6. The European Convention on Human Rights 
is applicable to all member states as well as several other European countries, and since the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ is explicitly part 
of the EU treaties
31 Case 34940/10, Northern Rock Grainger/UK, ECHR, 10 July 2012; Case 22186/03, Pešková v. the Czech 
Republic, ECHR, 26 November 2009. As a rule, compensation of the market value will need to be paid for 
expropriations of property rights, though this can be mitigated if well-motivated in the public interest, 
e.g. to take away undeserved or illegally obtained benefits due to for instance value created by already 
provided lender of last resort support by the central bank. 
32 Legal forbearance includes giving a temporary exemption of a requirement, or a short period of time to 
address a failure to fulfil. This would be illegal if the CRD or domestic laws explicitly order the super-
visor to act in certain circumstances, but many instruments of the supervisor allow him, but do not 
force him to act on transgressions immediately; see for instance Art. 136 RBD. Informal forbearance 
can be applied if a provision is interpreted in a more lenient manner than normally, or the supervisor by 
pure coincidence ‘fails’ to notice a transgression.
33 Art. 4 TEU. Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, Court of Justice 30 September 2003. Case C-45/08, Spector/CBFA, 
Court of Justice 23 December 2009, § 70-74. Also see Art. 54 RBD, as amended by CRD III Directive 
2010/76/EU. 
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 correct penalty for an infringement of a directive rule, but they must ensure in particular 
that infringements of directives and other EU laws are penalised in both procedural 
and substantive requirements that are similar to the treatment of equally important 
national provisions. The penalty has to be made effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
The determination of how to achieve this is left to national legislators, but it can amongst 
others take into account the gains made by somebody by infringing a directive provision. 
The proportionality requirement brings with it that a penalty can also be too heavy for 
the transgression, especially if it is more burdensome for nationals from other member 
states than for its own nationals. If a rule or instrument is not in line with this bench-
mark, or is not applied in line with that benchmark, the member state (and its public 
authorities) are deemed non-compliant with their treaty obligations, and are bound to 
repair this transgression. However, the court has long standing case law that secondary 
EU legislation such as directives will be interpreted in line with the treaty provisions if at 
all possible (instead of being annulled for incompatibility), and that national laws need 
to be interpreted (and applied) in line with directive provisions34.
The liability of a member state towards individual persons or entities under EU rules can 
be derived from the ‘direct effect’ that clear and unconditional EU rules can have35. If 
and in as far as a part of EU legislation was intended to give clear rights to individuals, 
and the member state can be held responsible (as a serious breach) for failing to give 
those rights, it becomes liable to repair the loss and damages if those damages would not 
have occurred if the individual had its rights as intended. In its Peter Paul judgment36, 
the court of justice gave some indicators when a banking supervisory authority (or the 
state in general to be precise) would be liable under EU law. It indicated that the direc-
tives that were applicable at the time (the deposit guarantee directive and the predecessor 
directives of the CRD and Mifid) intended to achieve the essential harmonisation neces-
sary for mutual recognition, allowing banks to operate across the EU on their European 
passport, with a specific addition for depositor protection in the form of the guarantee 
under the deposit guarantee directive37. The court indicated that some of the individual 
obligations are explicit (and implied that those could lead to liability). However, where 
such a specific rule of law that intends to confer rights on individuals is absent, or if such 
a rule is not infringed, there is no state liability under EU rules.
34 See, for instance, explicit considerations of the Court in the so-called co-insurance cases amongst 
which Case 220/83, Commission/France, Court of Justice 4 December 1986. For the relation between 
national laws and directive, see for instance Case C-356/00, Testa and Lazzeri/Consob, Court of Justice 
21 November 2002, §43.
35 See R.J. Theissen, EU Banking Supervision, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2013, Chap-
ters 3.5 and 21.10. 
36 Case C-222/02, Peter Paul/Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Court of Justice 12 October 2004. Also see Joined 
Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci/Italy, Court of Justice 19 November 1991, and Joined 
Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III, Court of Justice 5 March 1996. 
37 Deposit Guarantee Directive 1994/19/EC. See R.J. Theissen, EU Banking Supervision, Eleven Interna-
tional Publishing, The Hague, 2013, Chapter 18.5.
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The court clearly stated that none of the directives mentioned ‘conferred upon depositors 
a right to have the supervisors take supervisory measures in their interest’. The state/
supervisor was thus not the ‘agent’ for the depositors38, at least not to the point of man-
datory liability under EU rules. Germany was therefore free to stipulate that banking 
supervision (in general) should be performed solely in the public interest, even if such 
a determination under national law prevents individuals from claiming compensation 
for damages resulting from defective supervision on the part of that authority. If the 
specific rights and obligations of the directives are fulfilled, there is thus no need for 
domestic legislators to make supervisors liable for faulty supervision in general even if 
that arguably could have led to the bankruptcy of the supervised bank. In an additional 
consideration, the court considered that, as the liability issue vis-à-vis depositors was 
not necessary to ensure mutual recognition, the directives did not need to address the 
coordination of such liability.
The court based its judgment on the deposit guarantee directive and on the banking 
supervision directives valid at the time of the incident. The directives at that time did 
not contain the innovations on cross border cooperation and capital adequacy that were 
introduced from 2006 until 2013 as a result of amongst others BCBS work. As these 
changes as well as the proposed amendments to the CRD appear to indicate a ‘single 
market’ character more than a ‘minimum harmonisation mutual recognition’ directive, 
some of the courts’ deliberation on the need for an EU stance on supervisory liability may 
no longer be valid39. Some of the changes on amongst others significant branches could 
be deemed to protect depositors, though like in the Peter Paul case, these changes could 
as easily be judged to be (also) instituted in the interest of financial stability and the single 
market. In other financial sectors, more targeted protection is offered. In the insurance 
sector, it is quite certain that supervision has as its primary goal policyholder protection, 
not the public good in general40. The Solvency II directive has served to re-emphasize that 
point, leading to likely civil liability of the state and/or supervisory authorities in case 
supervision failed to safeguard those interests (possibly with an exemption if nothing the 
supervisor could have done, even in theory, could have safeguarded those interests, such 
as in a full financial system collapse). For those instances where the supervisor has been 
allocated a wider discretion (where it for instance has to take into account a wider range 
of goals, or has been given the choice to intervene or not in a legal forbearance delibera-
tion), that liability becomes more limited. In no case can the supervisor or its member 
state be held liable for damages to individuals on the basis of non-compliance with EU 
laws if either that particular damage or that particular individual is not the intended 
38 Some indicate that the supervisor or the state should be the agent to ameliorate the weak points in bank-
ing for specific groups of stakeholders (such as depositors), or for all stakeholders jointly. For the latter, 
see K. Alexander, ‘Corporate Governance and Banks: The Role of Regulation in Reducing the Principal-
Agent Problem’, Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 7, nos 1-2, 2006, pp. 17-40. 
39 L. Dragomir, European Prudential Banking Regulation and Supervision. The Legal Dimension, Rout-
ledge, Oxford, 2010, p. 309.
40 Arts. 27 and 28 Solvency II Directive 2009/138/EC.
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person that should be protected by the EU rule. Several specific obligations, however, do 
intend to give protection to specific individuals, such as the deposit guarantee obligation. 
Importantly, the general obligations for supervision – even though they may not be writ-
ten as general obligations towards depositors – are written as general obligations towards 
other member states, to fulfil their obligations under the mutual recognition framework. 
If another member state suffers damages from a failure of a member state to exercise 
supervision on for example the licensed bank that has a branch in the host member state, 
it may for that reason try to claim damages it suffers as a result.
Such a case, or at least the liability of a member state towards the citizens of another 
member state, resulted from the collapse of the Icelandic banking system. One of its 
banks had branches in the UK and the Netherlands. The deposit guarantee system of 
Iceland was at the time obliged to pay 20.000 (now 100.000) euro to both domestic and 
foreign depositors of the bank including its branches. The non-binding recitals to the 
deposit guarantee directive state that in principle the cost of financing a scheme must be 
borne by the banks themselves. The obligation to be able to pay within a set time period 
also indicates that the scheme needs to have funding in place in line with their liabilities, 
though it was noted that such ability should not endanger the stability of the banking 
system of the member state as a whole. Both this consideration and an explicit recital on 
the lack of liability of the member state towards depositors whose claim on a – properly 
set up – scheme cannot be paid out, have been eviscerated by legislative developments 
as a result of the Icesave/Landsbanki collapse41. The Icelandic scheme did not have suf-
ficient funds to pay out the depositors of its three major banks that collapsed at the same 
time. In a power struggle between on the one hand the UK and Dutch authorities and 
the Icelandic authorities on the other hand, the Icelandic scheme and government had 
to accept liability which was incompatible with the financial stability of the member 
state and the liability-recital of the directive, in order to survive the broader financial 
crisis the collapse of its banking system had caused. As Icelandic authorities were blamed 
for the collapse of the three big Icelandic banks, there was little or no sympathy for 
their dilemma42. Their argument that the deposit guarantee directive did not oblige the 
authorities to chip in, and did not constitute a guarantee that a scheme once properly set 
up, would be able to do pay out even if the majority of the banking system collapsed at 
once, were valid in the face of the directive recitals, and even based in part by the previ-
ous case law of the court of justice43. Under an amendment of the directive in 2009, each 
41 See the last recitals of Deposit Guarantee Directive 1994/19/EC.
42 See, for example, the report into the demise of Icesave and the instruments of the Dutch supervisor in 
relation to that branch of Landsbanki: A.J.C. De Moor-van Vlugt & C.E. Du Perron, De bevoegdheden 
van de Nederlandsche Bank inzake Icesave, 11 June 2009 (Dutch). 
43 Case C-222/02, Peter Paul/Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Court of Justice 12 October 2004, indicated that 
the obligations of the state were limited to setting up the scheme and providing it with information as set 
out in the directive, and did not provide depositors with claims to supervisors on defective supervision 
as long as the directive provisions is ensured. The problem for the Icelandic government was twofold: the 
minimum pay-out was not ensured in the face of the collapse of their financial system, and the respon-
sible authorities had failed to limit the losses of depositors in general, and were aiming to treat local 
Areeubankssafe.indd   18 8-11-2013   13:20:44
19
1  I n troduction
member state is now under an obligation to implement the directive in a manner that 
brings the scheme in a position to pay verified claims of depositor within 20 days44. If this 
is a ‘direct effect‘ obligation, which is likely, it effectively creates a sovereign guarantee for 
the funding of the scheme. The EFTA court since vindicated the Icelandic defence on the 
basis of the old directive text valid at that time; while acknowledging that under the 2009 
version of the directive, the member state would have been liable45. Only where a specific 
obligation is allocated to the member state, the EU courts will find him liable to honour 
that commitment towards an individual.
Response to the 2007-2013 subprime crisis
In response to the crisis that gradually developed in 2007, escalated in 2008 after the 
demise of Lehman Brothers and which is still influencing European banks and finan-
cial markets at the time of the closing of this book (and may continue into 2014), many 
worldwide and European actions have been taken. After a range of reports analysing 
the crisis, financial market participants and regulators have agreed common worldwide 
(non-binding) policies at the G-20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervisors (BCBS), and issued binding rules at the national 
level. The European Union has harmonised the reaction to the financial crisis in some 
areas, amongst others by introducing legislation for hedge funds and other alternative 
investment funds (and specifically for their managers) in the alternative investment 
fund managers directive, for credit rating agencies, adding new agencies and legisla-
tors for financial markets in the form of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and 
similar authorities in the securities and insurance sectors, and initiating tentative steps 
to address the so-called macroprudential risk by instituting the European systemic risk 
board. These initiatives address competitors of banks (shadow banks who compete with 
banks in lending and funding markets such as hedge funds) or service providers to and/
or subsidiaries of banks (credit rating agencies, trading venues and hedge funds).
Key aspects of the legislative agenda have been targeted directly at the prudential rules 
for banks and the supervision and public response capacity to problems at banks. In part, 
these have been implemented already. The CRD II and CRD III directives upgraded some 
demands on securitisations and on market risk, as well as on cross border cooperation 
in colleges of supervisors and on branches that are of systemic importance in the host 
member state, and introduced more specific demands on the management of liquidity 
risk (how to ensure sufficient cash is available to be able to honour withdrawals, even in 
stressed circumstances, and on remuneration (aligning the incentives embodied in sala-
ries and bonuses to the long term interest of the bank (and society). The EBA  regulation 
depositors better than depositors elsewhere in the EU, which was in violation of its obligations under the 
EU/EEA treaties. 
44 Art. 10.1 Deposit Guarantee Directive 1994/19/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC.
45 Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority/Iceland, EFTA Court, 28 January 2013, (conclusion in §178 
on the Directive as in force in 2008 when the relevant banks failed, and in §138-139 on the 2009 version 
of the Directive, when Art. 7 was replaced as a result of Directive 2009/14/EC).
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and the changes in the CRD upgraded the conflict resolution and harmonisation tools 
for the collective of EU national supervisors represented in the decision-making bod-
ies of EBA. For the quantitative aspects, these developments heavily relied on fast-track 
amendments (sometimes referred to as Basel II ½) to the version of the Basel capital 
accord that was being implemented in the EU at the time the 2007-2013 subprime crisis 
started to unfold.
A more fundamental overhaul of especially the quality of financial buffers and the 
amount of such buffers needed was agreed by the BCBS in 2010. These will, with some 
modifications be implemented in the EU over the period of 2014-2021 via the so-called 
CRD IV project (see above on amongst others the quality and size of financial buffers). 
A new directive (the CRD IV directive) and a new regulation (the CRR containing many 
of the quantitative demands on banks in a set of rules that is directly applicable in all 
member states) will become applicable in part at the start of 2014, and in part at the end 
of 2014 (for the areas where more detailed rules are mandated, to be issued or confirmed 
by the commission as level 2 commission directives or regulations, or as commission 
backed standards that are developed by EBA). Also expected, but not yet agreed or pub-
lished in a final form when this book closed, are new instruments to manage the poten-
tial or actual demise of a bank via recovery and resolution instruments46, and aspects of 
a banking union in the EU, via the establishment of a single supervisory mechanism in 
the Eurozone, and a resolution agency for the Eurozone.
1.3 Analysing Whether the CRD Is Fit for Purpose
Introduction
The analysis contained in this book is aimed at providing insight and ideas on the types 
of goals and testing-criteria that are necessary to assess whether the current legislation 
is fit for purpose. It will be based on the description in ‘EU banking supervision’, tak-
ing into account the concrete amendments already on the table that purport to deal 
with issues related to the 2007-2013 subprime crisis. It attempts an analysis on what the 
goals of banking legislation are or should be, and whether these are actually achieved or 
achievable by the EU banking directives.
Viewpoints that Determine the Outcome of this Analysis
The answer to these questions depends on the viewpoint taken. For me personally, three 
viewpoints come easily:
– from a supervisory policy development viewpoint;
– from an academic viewpoint;
– from a citizen (depositor/taxpayer/voter) viewpoint.
46 Commission, Proposal for a Recovery and Resolution Directive, COM(2012) 280 final, 6 June 2012.
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The three can barely be reconciled with each other, let alone across 31 member states of 
the EU/EEA, due to different cultural, historical, social, institutional and political links 
and drivers47. For policy reasons, you take the issues where progress can be made towards 
the goal you aim for, and leave aside those issues that would stall the entire process. That 
includes some compromises in order to achieve those issues you find important. Policy 
makers in this process accept the ‘bad’ issues other negotiators want to achieve. From 
an academic viewpoint, you strive for perfection, and any ‘bad’ issues are unforgivable. 
From a citizen’s viewpoint, you want safety, availability of services, freedom and low 
costs at the same time (but in good times, I want availability of services and freedom, 
and in crisis times, I want safety, in both situations combined with low costs). These are 
generalisations, of course, but do reflect some of the difficulty in looking at the question 
whether the CRD is fit for purpose.
This acknowledges that the actions of banks, their individual supervisors and the mem-
ber states, as well as of EU institutions such as the ECB and the European commission 
are subject to a complex set of incentives and considerations. Important among those 
are not only the text of the law and the purposes it sets out to achieve, but also whether 
those can be paid for, who will bear losses and in which country, and whether a full 
application of the law would be proportionate. Ultimately, banking supervision is not an 
idealistic environment but a very pragmatic environment: ‘if I do something now, will it 
help prevent this bank going bankrupt or will it actually speed it on its route to failure? If 
I don’t do it, will it go bankrupt, and if so, whose interests are still protected?’
To assess whether the CRD is fit for purpose, the criteria set by the court of justice are 
followed in this book48. In its approach, the various viewpoints are condensed to ask 
whether the legislation works in the way advertised on the box, regardless of how it is 
exactly implemented in the member state, in the law or institutionally, and regardless 
of how other public policy goals of the member state interact with the implementation 
(unless specifically allowed via the limited general good/public policy exemptions). To 
do so, it looks at the stated goals, how it fits into the EU treaties (TEU and TFEU), the 
47 J. Black, Rules and Regulators, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 231-234.
48 Arts. 36 and 114 TFEU for single market harmonisation issues, and Arts. 52, 62 and 65 TFEU for the free-
doms of establishment, services and capital. Set out in a range of case law, for instance in Case C-41/90, 
Hoefner and Elser/Macroton, Court of Justice 23 April 1991; Case C-412/06, Hamilton/Volksbank Filder, 
Court of Justice 10 April 2008; Case C-356/08, Commission/Austria, Court of Justice 25 June 2009, §37, 
and C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union/Viking Line, 
Court of Justice 11 December 2007, §33, 34, and 57; Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, Court of Justice 30 Sep-
tember 2003, §68-70, and Case C-241/97, Skandia, Court of Justice 20 April 1999; Case C-28/99, Ver-
donck, Everaert and De Baedts, Court of Justice 3 May 2001, § 37-38; Case C-233/94, Deposit Insurance 
Case, Germany/Parliament and Council, Court of Justice 13 May 1997, §10-19. This is a consequence of 
the fact that EU laws, issued within the boundaries of the treaties, are supreme over national laws and 
should be implemented effectively. Also see D. Chalmers, C. Hadjiemmanuil, G. Monti, A. Tomkins, 
European Union Law, CUP, Cambridge, 2006, Chapters 2, 5 and 9; R.J. Theissen, EU Banking Supervi-
sion, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2013, Chapters 3, 4.3 and 5.3; especially Chapter 3.5.
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phrasing of the legislation and the way it is applied, and whether these components are 
consistent. While doing this, the court allows considerable leeway to the legislators (to 
work in line with the aspirations of the treaty) and to the public authorities translating 
or applying the EU legislation (to work in line with the legislation within the leeway 
granted to them).
Market Friendly or Coercion; is the Viewpoint of Banks Important?
A fourth viewpoint is the viewpoint of a bank. In practice, their viewpoint is important 
during the process of drafting legislation. Due to their expertise, funds, political impor-
tance and power, the amount of funds available to lobby, and due to being the primary 
subject of banking legislation, they have a distinctive voice in the legislative process and in 
the evaluation of its application. This is a fact of life, and where it concerns state interven-
tion such influence may even be welcome. Governmental interference in the private busi-
ness should be resisted where possible. Where necessary; it should be instituted in a man-
ner that is effective and efficient (including such issues as choosing the method that results 
in the most freedom and the least costs possible for the subject of state intervention).
In most areas of government intervention, however, this is balanced by an equally power-
ful, knowledgeable and experienced lobby for the other interested parties. This is true for 
e.g. carmakers (drivers associations), medical profession (patient organisations and good 
causes), public transport (travellers organisations). Even though in some areas of financial 
services regulation (e.g. consumer credit, deposit guarantee or best execution), consumer 
organisations and investor organisations have played a role, this has not been the case 
for prudential supervision, especially not in those areas that are primarily important 
for the financial stability goal. The ‘balancing’ role to provide counterarguments to the 
banking sector in the legislative and policy formation process on prudential regulation 
has thus fallen to the legislators and/or supervisors themselves. This has led to important 
downsides. Apart from difficulties in being the claimant on behalf of bank-clients and the 
judge of the strength of banking requirements at the same time, it has led to prudential 
regulation being a subject remote from the public eye, with common misperceptions as to 
the intent and effectiveness outside of an ‘elite’ of certain banking supervisors and bank 
lobbyists, together with the individual drafters of banking legislation.
As a result, the actual supervisory rules may be more geared to the demands of banks 
than desirable, and may be drafted in such a way that they lack any effectiveness. Apart 
from crisis-times, when the cost of widespread banking failures is high on the public 
radar and ‘muscular action‘ is taken to show that politicians/banks/supervisors take the 
concerns of the public debate seriously49, in the good years that follow prudential super-
visors get most attention when it hampers the banks’ business or causes them costs, or 
shocks the public by allowing a bank to fail when everybody had forgotten that such a 
49 For instance, the debate on remuneration and on splitting up speculative and useful banks. See Chapters 
3.3 and 4. Also see R.J. Theissen, EU Banking Supervision, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 
2013, Chapters 2, 4 and 13.
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thing might actually happen. This has led gradually to more market friendly behaviour 
when a crisis has not occurred recently. Failure to comply with prudential rules does 
not have a market disciplinary effect, and innovatively risky behaviour in areas not 
explicitly covered by pre-existing legislation is not addressed vigorously in new laws and 
super vision. For instance in the area of risk management (such as subprime mortgages 
or short termism in remuneration practices), problems were not vigorously pursued in 
supervision even when there are pre-existing high level rules, if such high level rules 
were not explicitly translated in guidance for a specific topic.
The tendency in the years leading up to Basel II/CRD of 2004/2006 had been to become 
more market friendly (i.e. bank and financial market friendly) in the western world. 
Apart from Japan, Spain and Sweden, the main negotiating parties in the BCBS and G10 
had no recent experience with crises. As the downsides of Basel I were becoming clearer 
as banks adjusted their business more and more to its loopholes, the revisions that came 
out of the negotiating process were developed more and more to accommodate market 
friendly and very technical theoretical perspectives50.
Those areas where prudential supervisors are strict (information gathering, capital ele-
ments) were either under intense pressure to become more lenient (securitisation, hybrid 
capital, reporting, mergers and acquisitions controls), or were not on the table for discus-
sion on how to make them stricter (definition of capital, secrecy, licensing conditions). 
Prudential supervisors, depending also on their local culture and the size and expertise 
of their counterparts in the banking sector, operated more on a cooperative basis (where 
consensus with the banks was sought) and less on a coercive basis. In the areas where 
criminal investigators, consumer or investor organisations were most active (i.e. anti-
money laundering and measures to protect individual clients against their financial ser-
vices providers) a contrary movement could be observed, where ever stricter measures 
and coercive supervision became the norm, in line with public expectations.
In assessing whether the CRD is fit for purpose, the balance struck between coercive and 
burdensome measures and the flexibility and efficiency that is possible has to be taken 
into account. In this respect, it would also be desirable to assess whether prudential 
banking regulation can be brought out of its ivory tower, and made clearer to its benefi-
ciaries (the participants in the system and the counterparties of banks; not to mention 
the public treasury that currently operates as lender/saviour of last resort).
Part of the proportionality discussion also focuses on whether supervisory rules and 
supervision should be commensurate to the goals legislators want to be guarantee or 
aspire to. When asking what should be minimally useful to achieve prudential goals, 
it becomes e.g. clearer that the survival of the legal entity with a bank-license is not 
50 T. Padoa-Schioppa, Regulating Finance, OUP, Oxford, 2004, pp. 2-5 describes the market friendly 
approach chosen by regulators/legislators.
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important from the point of view of the goals; but the continued provision of the func-
tions banking as a whole provides to society/the economy is much more important. Even 
if the entity fails, the guaranteed aspects of counterparty protection can for example be 
continued by another legal entity that has taken over the most relevant activities of the 
failed bank.
In conclusion: This assessment is made from the point of view of policy development, aca-
demia and participant in society, aiming to balance pragmatism, usefulness and the holy 
grail of being objectively ‘right’. A downside particular to prudential supervision is that 
the majority of users of the functions provided by banks choose not to be involved in the 
development of prudential requirements. In as far as end-users are involved, it concerns 
professional organisations of (financial) companies arguing for reduced safety require-
ments on banks when lending to them, or conduct of business areas. In all other cases, the 
burden of taking into account the interests of users falls on legislators and supervisors, 
who will unilaterally have to withstand pressure from financial industry lobbyists.
Structuring the Analysis
The question addressed by this book focuses on the determination of what goals should 
be agreed for banking supervision, and whether these are achieved by the requirements/
instruments provided in the CRD. Is the CRD fit for purpose? In this context, it will be 
important to differentiate goals and instruments. It is for instance a different question 
whether financial stability or client protection should continue to be aimed for, than 
whether one of the measuring instruments for achieving such goals should indeed be 
that a bank has a certain level of financial buffers. Following from an analysis of the 
goals of prudential banking supervision, the follow-up question is whether the existing 
(and anticipated) EU rulebook and structures are sufficient to achieve the goals that have 
been set or should be set. Do the instruments set out at the EU level allow supervision to 
fulfil the goals?
The analysis is structured along these lines; corresponding to the chapters contained in 
this book:
1 Defining the question
2 What goals should prudential banking supervision aim for? 
3 How absolute are the goals, and what is thus the benchmark against which prudential banking 
supervision should be assessed?
4 Assessment of prudential banking supervision against the benchmark
5 Overall analysis and conclusions
The references to the structure of banking supervision as described in chapter 1.2 and 
further analysed in this research is based on the binding and non-binding rules available 
as well as the available descriptions of practices, policy texts, literature and case law. This 
book thus does not contain a ‘law & economics’ or a comparison of legal systems (though 
where relevant both legal, economic and policy texts of any legal system are used). 
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The focus is on EU law, EU economics and EU developments in as far as it is relevant 
for answering the question whether the deduced goals of prudential supervision and the 
CRD are compatible. As the description in the sister-publication showed, the CRD only 
contains part of the prudential regime on banks. In the context of this question, whether 
the CRD is fit for purpose will also take into account elements of prudential supervision 
that are contained in other EU rules, including related current and future sets of rules 
on winding-up procedures, guarantee funds and resolution, as well as the developments 
towards a full or partial banking union. This book adds some overarching discussions on 
goals, testing criteria, gaps and overlaps.
The analysis is built on investigating the underlying rationale for supervision. In part, 
the goals will be derived from worldwide accords and papers; in part, they will be specific 
to the EU and derived from banking legislation and actions, as well as from the EU 
treaties51. This includes the stated reasons, as well as the effective rationale that will have 
to be derived from the inner consistencies and inconsistencies, the focus of supervision 
and instruments allocated, as well as from published commentaries on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of banking supervision.
There is a fair chance that some of the analysis/proposals/solutions put forth in this 
analysis may be off the beaten path to some (as they are too liberal, too right wing, too 
communist, take your pick), ‘interesting’ in the UK sense to others, and difficult to 
achieve for many. The same can, however, be said of many proposals that are currently 
on the table or already implemented, that only a short while ago seemed inconceivable 
for the near future (such as the institution of EBA, or the plans to introduce aspects of 
a banking union in the Eurozone). The analysis nonetheless tries to evaluate the CRD 
against the goals it might want to achieve in practice, and finds it lacking.
Some solutions are put forth for the gaps identified. This is not a so-called law/economics 
or international comparison book; instead, it focuses on gaps in light of the goals that 
should have been met. Most of the proposals will focus on pragmatic and achievable 
aspects that borrow from existing experience. Other proposals are based on the idea that 
some goals should be met even if there is no experience available. In this sense, it is both 
an idealistic and a cynical/pragmatic study. Some proposals might only be feasible if we 
can ignore the existing evolutionary legislation and practices on banking supervision in 
the EU in a ‘blank sheet’ approach. The underlying purpose of this book is not an enact-
ment of each proposal, but to assist the discussion on solutions that has been ongoing 
since the start of the latest crisis by setting forth what it should achieve, based on what 
is already there52.
51 The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; TEU and 
TFEU respectively.
52 This refers to the status quo and future developments on the CRD and associated prudential rules and 
regulations as introduced in Chapter 1.2.
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In conclusion: the work related to this book focuses on the solidity of banks, and what 
can be done to make them safer. The central question is: is the CRD fit for purpose? As 
shown in ‘EU banking supervision’, the CRD itself only contains a part of the solid-
ity regime applicable to banks, so the discussion on the CRD includes references to all 
aspects of ‘prudential supervision of banks’. To answer this question of what can be done 
to make prudential supervision of banks fit for purpose, first, it will be analysed what 
goals should be agreed on for banking supervision and to what extent those need to be 
guaranteed. Subsequently, the conclusions of that analysis are used as benchmarks to 
assess whether the prudential requirements/instruments measure up to them.
Jargon and abbreviations are difficult to avoid when discussing EU banking supervision. 
The use of abbreviations is avoided where possible. Jargon is infectious. When working 
in this area, at a certain point in time you stop realising that not everyone knows what an 
ABS or SPV is, or even what these acronyms mean when written in full as asset backed 
security or special purpose vehicle, respectively. Where it was realised that jargon/abbre-
viations are used, jargon is explained where first used, and referenced to later on in the 
book. Abbreviations are only used for the core players in this field and the core legislative 
texts they helped develop, and limited to about 40 (see the list of acronyms and defini-
tions at the end of this book). Standard or self-explanatory jargon as used in the business 
sections of newspapers is, however, used freely.
One key example of jargon is the distinction made in the area of requirements for bank-
ing between regulation and supervision. Roughly, practitioners in banking supervision 
refer to regulation when they mean the legal requirements (including the non-binding 
advice on how to apply those requirements), while supervision refers to the application of 
those rules in practice. However, requirements and their application in practice are the 
same. A requirement without an effective method to ensure application has no impact; 
supervision without an underlying clear requirement to uphold is meaningless. The 
test-subject of this book on whether the CRD is fit for purpose is therefore the way the 
prudential requirements are set, read and applied in practice.
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